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I. INTRODUCTION
Familiar to most Americans, the double jeopardy clause (the
clause) of the Fifth Ameridment1 to the United States Constitution rep-
resents an idea so basic that the average person probably would feel
comfortable attempting to explain it.2 Courts confronted with the task
of fixing the meaning of the clause and the scope of its protection, how-
ever, have found the task to be far from simple. The United States Su-
preme Court has been no exception.3
During the 1989 Term, the Supreme Court continued its ongoing
efforts to define double jeopardy protection.4 In Dowling v. United
States5 the Court held that the collateral estoppel component of the
double jeopardy clause' does not bar the admission of all evidence relat-
ing to a prior alleged crime of which the defendant had been acquitted.7
Less than five months later, however, in Grady v. Corbin,' the Court
held that the double jeopardy clause bars subsequent prosecutions in
which the government, in order to establish an essential element of the
crime charged in the latter prosecution, will prove conduct constituting
an offense for which the defendant already has been prosecuted.'
Grady represents the culmination of a gradual movement by the
Court toward increasing defendants' protection against the burdens of
1. The double jeopardy clause provides: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969) (noting that every state recognizes
some prohibition against double jeopardy); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957) (recog-
nizing that the prohibition against double jeopardy "is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-
American system of jurisprudence"); George C. Thomas III, The Prohibition of Successive Prose-
cutions for the Same Offense: In Search of a Definition, 71 IOWA L. REv. 323, 325 (1986) (noting
that the law of double jeopardy dates back to ancient Greek, Hebrew, and Roman law and exists
today in European and Asian nations).
3. The Supreme Court has noted that "the decisional law in the [double jeopardy] area is a
veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator." Al-
bernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.).
4. This Re6ent Development is an examination of the Court's efforts to define double jeop-
ardy protection rather than an examination of the Court's tests for what constitutes the same
offense. Determining what rights do or do not exist under the double jeopardy clause goes consid-
erably beyond the task of defining what constitutes a same offense under the clause. See infra text
accompanying note 123.
5. 110 S. Ct. 668 (1990).
6. For a discussion of collateral estoppel in the context of double jeopardy analysis, see infra
notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
7. Dowling, 110 S. Ct. at 672.
8. 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
9. Id. at 2093.
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successive prosecutions.1" Grady, however, seems to conflict with much
of the Court's prior double jeopardy jurisprudence. Unresolved incon-
sistencies between Grady and the Court's prior rulings have left the
state and lower federal courts with a confusing mixture of standards to
apply in double jeopardy inquiries.1
The Grady decision poses other difficulties as well. Although the
application of the Grady rule in a pretrial setting, prior to the admis-
sion of evidence, seems fairly clear and manageable, its application after
the admission of evidence at trial, and during the postconviction ap-
peals process, is a more complex matter and one the majority in Grady
failed to address. 2 Furthermore, although Grady apparently leaves in-
tact Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), the scope of the Rule is far less
clear after Grady."
Despite the inadequacies in its opinion, however, the Grady major-
ity rightly recognized that, in some situations, strict adherence to the
Court's prior double jeopardy jurisprudence, and particularly to the test
enunciated in Blockburger v. United States, 4 failed to provide defend-
ants with protection that reflected the values embodied in the clause.1
5
Although in Grady this recognition led the majority to expand defend-
ants' rights in the context of successive prosecutions,' 6 the majority has
laid the groundwork for a further reevaluation of double jeopardy pro-
tections. Thus, the Court now is free to tailor double jeopardy protec-
tion to correspond more closely with the constitutional interests
implicated in a given case.17 In the context of multiple punishments in
state court, this well may mean a long-overdue reconsideration of the
protection currently afforded defendants.'
This Recent Development examines the implications of the Su-
preme Court's latest efforts to define double jeopardy protection. Part
II outlines the interests that the double jeopardy clause protects and
reviews some of the Court's past efforts to identify and define violations
of the clause. Part III focuses on the Dowling and Grady decisions and
discusses their impact on each other and on prior double jeopardy case
10. See infra part IV.C.1.
11. See infra part IV.B.2.
12. See infra part IV.D.1.
13. See infra part IV.D.2.
14. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). For a discussion of Blockburger, see infra text accompanying notes
27-32.
15. 110 S. Ct. at 2093 (observing that "a technical comparison of the elements of the two
offenses as required by Blockburger does not protect defendants sufficiently from the burdens of
multiple trials").
16. See id.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 234-41.
18. See infra part V.B.
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law. Part IV argues that Grady represents a view of double jeopardy
protection only remotely concerned with the language in the clause. To
this end, Part IV compares Grady with prior case law, including Dow-
ling. Part IV also analyzes the impact of Grady in the state and lower
federal courts, as well as its possible effect on Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b). Part V proposes a change in double jeopardy analysis in the
context of state prosecutions. This Recent Development concludes that
the Court should continue to reevaluate its tests for double jeopardy
violations in order to effectuate better both the language and the values
of the double jeopardy clause.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The double jeopardy clause provides that no person shall "be sub-
ject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."1
The clause protects criminal defendants against multiple punishments
for the same offense and against further prosecutions for the same of-
fense after either conviction or acquittal.20 The Supreme Court's cases
make clear that a finding vel non of a double jeopardy violation in a
given case depends, in part, upon which of the double jeopardy protec-
tions the defendant invokes.2
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the double jeopardy
clause and, thus, the prohibitions of the clause apply to state prosecutions. Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
20. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
21. See Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 500 (1984) (recognizing that the double jeopardy
clause might prohibit multiple prosecutions for the same offense even when it does not prohibit
multiple punishments for the same offense); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166-67 n.6 (1977) (noting
that "[e]ven if two offenses are sufficiently different to permit the imposition of consecutive
sentences, successive prosecutions will be barred in some circumstances where the second prosecu-
tion requires the relitigation of factual issues already resolved by the first"); Thomas, supra note 2,
at 342 (arguing that the Supreme Court has formulated a broader definition of "same offense" in
the context of successive prosecutions). Generally, the Court has treated the protections against
postconviction and postacquittal prosecutions for the same offense almost identically for purposes
of double jeopardy inquiries. In either case, further prosecution poses equivalent threats to crimi-
nal defendants, threats not dependent on a finding of guilt or innocence. See, e.g., Missouri v.
Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 369 n.1 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the existence of a
double jeopardy violation does not depend upon whether the first trial ended in acquittal or con-
viction). For a discussion of the interests served by the prohibition of successive prosecutions for
the same offense, see also infra text accompanying notes 23 and 24. In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S.
436 (1970), the Court held that the double jeopardy clause embodies the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, which is the only protection against retrial after acquittal that does not exist for retrial
after conviction. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. This exception aside, both situa-
tions have been treated identically in double jeopardy analysis.
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A. The Prohibition of Multiple Punishments for the Same Offense
The Supreme Court has been quite successful in formulating a con-
sensus definition of double jeopardy violations in the context of multi-
ple punishments for the same offense in the same prosecution.22 This
success probably stems from the fact that the prohibition against multi-
ple punishments serves fewer important purposes than the prohibition
against multiple prosecutions. Barring successive prosecutions prevents
the government both from harassing defendants with repeated prosecu-
tions and from rehearsing its presentation of proof at one trial in prepa-
ration for a subsequent trial.23 Barring successive prosecutions also
protects the integrity of a prior acquittal and, in the case of a prior
conviction, prevents a second punishment when the law authorizes only
one.
2 4
In contrast, prohibiting the imposition of multiple punishments in
a single proceeding implicates only the last concern. When the govern-
ment seeks to impose multiple punishments in the same prosecution, no
repetitious litigation occurs, nor does a prior acquittal exist whose in-
tegrity the multiple punishments may imperil.25 Furthermore, some of
the Court's decisions suggest that the clause primarily reflects the
Framers' concern with second prosecutions rather than second punish-
ments.2 Thus, the imposition of multiple punishments in the same pro-
ceedings implicates fewer constitutional concerns than does subjecting a
defendant to successive prosecutions.
As a result, the Court consistently has adhered to a single test,
enunciated in Blockburger v. United States,2 7 for determining the exis-
22. See Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2091 n.8. Generally, the issue of multiple punishments
for the same offense arises only when multiple charges are brought in one prosecution. The double
jeopardy clause bars multiple punishments for the same offense imposed in different prosecutions
to the same extent that it would if the punishments were imposed in the same proceeding. As a
practical matter, however, the defendant has no incentive to invoke the protection against multiple
punishments for the same offense when the punishments are imposed in different proceedings. In
that situation, the defendant instead can invoke the double jeopardy prohibition of a second prose-
cution, which offers defendants broader protection and a much better chance of winning their
double jeopardy argument. See infra part II.B.
23. See Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2091-92.
24. See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 778 (1985) (recognizing that, after conviction
and sentencing in a prior prosecution, punishment pursuant to a second prosecution risks being
unauthorized); MARTIN L. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 96 (1969); Thomas, supra note 2, at 341.
25. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 342. Moreover, to the extent the Constitution allows multi-
ple punishments, a defendant might prefer to have all punishments imposed in one proceeding. Id.
26. "The prohibition is not against being twice punished, but against being twice put in jeop-
ardy." United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896). See also Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 451-
54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that "same offense" most accurately reflects the an-
cient prohibition against double jeopardy when applied to successive prosecutions); Kepner v.
United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); Respublica v. Shaffer, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 236, 237 (1788).
27. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). As the Blockburger Court noted, id. at 304, the test actually had
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tence of double jeopardy violations in the context of multiple punish-
ments. According to the Blockburger test, when the same act or
transaction constitutes a violation of two different statutory provisions
under which a person may be punished, the offenses are not the
same-and the imposition of multiple punishment does not violate the
double jeopardy clause-only if each provision requires proof of a fact
that the other does not. " Perhaps the clearest illustration of the Block-
burger test is its application to punishments for greater and lesser in-
cluded offenses. By definition, conviction for the lesser offense requires
no proof beyond that which is necessary for conviction for the greater
offense. 29 Thus, under Blockburger, the imposition of multiple punish-
ments for greater and lesser included offenses would violate the double
jeopardy clause.
The Blockburger test ensures that a court does not impose punish-
ment for a single offense under more than one statute when Congress
intended punishment under only one statute.30 The test is based on the
assumption that legislatures generally do not intend to impose punish-
ment for the same offense under two separate statutes.3 1 If, however,
the prosecution can demonstrate that the legislature intended that mul-
tiple punishments be available, a court may impose multiple punish-
ments even if, under Blockburger, they are punishments for the same
offense.32 Thus, the Court has treated the prohibition against punish-
ments for the same offense more as a measure of legislative intent than
as a strict constitutional prohibition against any imposition of multiple
punishments for the same offense.33
been adopted in Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911). It is, however, the Block-
burger court that is credited with establishing the test, and thus the test derives its name from
that case. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366-67 (1983). The Blockburger test is unquestion-
ably the only standard for determining double jeopardy violations in the context of multiple pun-
ishments. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2091 n.8.
28. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
29. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 708-09 (1980).
30. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 778 (1985). See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359,
366-68 (1983). Blockburger was developed as a rule of federal law. Nevertheless, the Court has
applied Blockburger in the context of multiple punishments imposed by a state court, presumably
as a rule of statutory construction that is applicable to state, as well as federal, legislation. See
Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368.
31. See Whalen, 445 U.S. at 691-92.
32. See id. at 692; Garrett, 471 U.S. at 778-79; Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368-69; cf. George C.
Thomas HI, Multiple Punishments for the Same Offense: The Analysis after Missouri v. Hunter,
62 WASH. U. L.Q. 79, 98 (1984) (suggesting that punishments are not multiple for the purposes of
double jeopardy analysis if authorized by the legislature, and that, therefore, it is irrelevant if the
punishments are for the same offense).
33. In the context of multiple punishments, Blockburger has been referred to as a mere rule
of statutory construction. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2091. Nevertheless, Blockburger is also a rule of
constitutional dimension because the Constitution requires an accurate assessment of congres-
sional intent regarding multiple punishments. See Whalen, 445 U.S. at 689. To the extent that
[Vol. 45:273
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B. The Prohibition of Successive Prosecutions for the Same Offense
The Court has adopted a broader view of the prohibition against
successive prosecutions. The Blockburger test is certainly a part of the
double jeopardy analysis in the context of successive prosecutions; if
two offenses are the same under the Blockburger test, then the govern-
ment may not, under any circumstances, prosecute a defendant for one
of the offenses after a separate prosecution for the other offense. 4
Blockburger, however, does not provide the exclusive test for determin-
ing whether successive prosecutions violate the double jeopardy
clause.3 5 Prior to the Grady decision, the Supreme Court found double
jeopardy violations in two cases involving successive prosecutions, even
though a strict application of the Blockburger test would not have
barred the second prosecutions. 6 In Ashe v. Swenson"7 the Court held
that the double jeopardy clause embodies the doctrine of collateral es-
toppel." Thus, once an issue of ultimate fact has been decided by a
valid and final judgment, the issue cannot be relitigated between the
same parties.39 In Harris v. Oklahoma40 the Court held that if a statu-
Blockburger provides an accurate assessment of congressional intent regarding multiple punish-
ments, the Constitution requires that the rule be applied. Id. at 692.
34. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977).
35. Id. at 166-67 n.6. In Brown the Court held that prosecution and punishment for auto
theft, following prosecution and punishment for the lesser included offense of joyriding, violated
the double jeopardy clause. Id. at 169. The Court based its holding on a simple application of the
Blockburger test. See id. at 168.
36. See Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2092. See also id. at 2097 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
37. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
38. In United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916), the Court established collateral
estoppel as a rule of federal criminal law. The Court, however, previously had refused to invoke the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to require states to adopt criminal collateral
estoppel. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958). Explaining why criminal collateral estoppel is
embodied in the double jeopardy clause, the Court merely said, "[flor whatever else that constitu-
tional guarantee [i.e. the double jeopardy clause] may embrace ... it surely protects a man who
has been acquitted from having to 'run the gauntlet' a second time." Id. at 445-46. The Court
failed to explain both the precise meaning of "run the gauntlet" and why the clause protects de-
fendants from having to do so twice. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan explained that,
because the Fifth Amendment applies to states, the Court's test for the same offense would apply
to state proceedings as well as federal proceedings; thus, the federal standard of criminal collateral
estoppel applies to states. Id. at 450 (Brennan, J., concurring). Until Ashe v. Swenson, however,
collateral estoppel had never been held to be constitutionally required. See id. at 445 n.10. In fact,
the Court originally instituted the federal rule of criminal collateral estoppel as an addition to,
rather than a part of, the rights guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment. See Oppenheimer, 242
U.S. at 88. Therefore, the federal standard of criminal collateral estoppel was never a constitu-
tional standard, and thus provides no justification for incorporating criminal collateral estoppel
into the Fourteenth Amendments double jeopardy protection. Nevertheless, the doctrine is now
an established component of double jeopardy protection.
39. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443. For a discussion of the Court's treatment of the term "issue of
ultimate fact," see infra note 58.
40. 433 U.S. 682 (1977).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:273
tory offense incorporates a different statutory offense without specify-
ing the latter's elements, the government may not prosecute a
defendant for each crime at different trials.4'
By the 1980s, the Court clearly had recognized a distinction be-
tween multiple punishments and successive prosecutions for the pur-
pose of determining double jeopardy violations. As the Court entered
the 1989 Term, however, the extent to which the Court would empha-
size this distinction remained unclear. The Court soon would decide
two cases that would clarify the distinction between the analyses in the
two contexts.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Dowling v. United States
1. Majority Opinion
Dowling v. United States42 was a setback for criminal defendants
because it limited defendants' ability to use the double jeopardy clause
to bar the admission of evidence of past crimes.43 Dowling was charged
with the federal crimes of bank robbery and armed robbery." At trial,
the government, relying on Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b),45 offered
the testimony of a witness regarding a burglary of her home that had
taken place two weeks after the bank robbery at issue.46 The witness
identified Dowling as one of the culprits involved in the burglary.47 The
government offered this evidence to support its identification of Dow-
41. In Harris the defendant was convicted of felony murder based on a homicide that oc-
curred during an armed robbery. The state subsequently sought to prosecute the defendant for
that armed robbery. The second prosecution would have been permitted by Blockburger because
the Oklahoma felony murder statute did not require proof of armed robbery. Any felony could be
used to prove felony murder. Thus, felony murder required proof of something-a killing-that
armed robbery did not, and armed robbery required proof of something-an armed robbery-that
felony murder did not. Therefore, Harris does not follow from a rigid application of Blockburger.
See Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2092.
42. 110 S. Ct. 668 (1990). Five Justices, Chief Justice Rehnqulst and Justices Blackmun,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, joined Justice White's majority opinion. Justices Marshall and
Stevens joined in Justice Brennan's dissent.
43. See id. at 680 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. Dowling was charged under the federal bank robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1988),
and the federal armed robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1988). Dowling also was charged with
crimes under the laws of the Virgin Islands, where the robbery occurred.
45. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake, or accident.
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
46. 110 S. Ct. at 670.
47. Id.
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ling as the bank robber.48 A jury previously had acquitted Dowling of
charges arising out of the burglary, and Dowling objected to the wit-
ness's testimony, claiming that the double jeopardy clause barred its
admission. 9 The district court, however, allowed the testimony.
50
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit held that the collateral estoppel component of the double jeopardy
clause barred the government from introducing evidence of Dowling's
participation in a crime of which he had been acquitted. 1 The Third
Circuit also ruled that the evidence was inadmissible under the Federal
Rules of Evidence.2 Invoking the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Huddleston v. United States,53 the Third Circuit noted that, under
Rule 404(b), evidence of a defendant's past crimes is admissible only if
the jury reasonably can conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the past crime occurred and that the defendant committed it.54
The Third Circuit reasoned that a second jury should not be allowed to
conclude that Dowling had committed the burglary when a previous
jury had acquitted him of that crime.5
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Third Circuit's reasoning
on the admissibility of the testimony.58 In an opinion by Justice White,
the majority held that the admission of the testimony did not violate
the collateral estoppel component of the double jeopardy clause, 57 be-
48. The Government believed that the witness's description of the gun and mask possessed
by the burglar indicated that these items might be the same as those possessed by the bank rob-
ber. Id. Also, a second man involved in the burglary allegedly was involved in the bank robbery as
well. Thus, tying Dowling to the burglary would help implicate him in the bank robbery. Id.
49. Id. at 671. Dowling agreed that the acquittal in the case involving the burglary did not
bar prosecution for the bank robbery. The only issue was whether the admission of the witness's
testimony violated the double jeopardy clause. Id.
50. Id. at 670-71.
51. United States v. Dowling, 855 F.2d 114, 120-22 (3d Cir. 1988), af'd on other grounds, 110
S. Ct. 668 (1990).
52. 855 F.2d at 122.
53. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
54. See id. at 689. The Huddleston holding rested on the rationale that unless a jury could
find that the defendant had committed the past crimes, evidence about them was not relevant and,
thus, not admissible. See id. The Court also noted that if the introduction of past-crimes evidence
was unduly prejudicial, a court could invoke Rule 403 to exclude the evidence even when the evi-
dence was admissible under Rule 404(b). Id. at 691. The Huddleston Court, however, did not con-
sider any possible constitutional ramifications of its decision.
55. See 855 F.2d at 122. The Third Circuit noted that even if the evidence were admissible
under Huddleston, it should have been excluded under Rule 403. Id.
56. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Third Circuit's holding that the witness's testi-
mony was inadmissible. Its ultimate disposition in the case, however, was to affirm the Third Cir-
cuit. Although the Third Circuit found the evidence inadmissible, it had affirmed Dowling's
conviction because it found that the admission of the evidence was harmless error. 855 F.2d at 122-
24.
57. 110 S. Ct. at 672. The Court also rejected Dowling's argument that the introduction of
the past-crimes evidence violated the due process guarantee of fundamental fairness. Id. at 674-75.
1991]
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cause Dowling's earlier acquittal on the burglary charge was not dispos-
itive of the ultimate issue in the case at bar. 8 The majority began its
analysis of the collateral estoppel issue by assuming arguendo that the
jury which had acquitted Dowling on the burglary charge had deter-
mined that a reasonable doubt existed as to whether Dowling was the
burglar. In determining the admissibility of the testimony, however,
the issue was whether a jury could find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that Dowling had committed the earlier crime.6 0 Because the two
situations called for different standards of proof in determining Dow-
ling's culpability in the burglary, the issues were different for the pur-
pose 'of double jeopardy analysis.6 " The majority thus found the
collateral estoppel doctrine inapplicable.62  The majority also concluded
that, even if it were to apply the collateral estoppel doctrine, Dowling
had failed to meet the burden of showing that the issue he sought to
avoid relitigating was, in fact, decided in his favor in the first
proceeding."'
2. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Mar-
shall and Stevens, disagreed with each holding of the Court.6 ' Justice
58. 110 S. Ct. at 672. Much confusion exists in the federal courts over the kinds of issues that
trigger collateral estoppel. Some courts hold that collateral estoppel bars only "ultimate" issues,
while others hold that it bars "necessary" or "essential" issues. See Synanon Church v. United
States, 820 F.2d 421, 426-27 (D.C. Cir. 1987). An "ultimate" issue involves the facts that necessa-
rily must be found in order for the court to impose obligations or sanctions. See The Evergreens v.
Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 928 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Evergreens v. Commissioner, 323 U.S.
720 (1944). For example, the only ultimate issues in a criminal trial are the existence or nonexis-
tence of each statutory element of the crime. "Necessary" or "essential" issues are those issues
"actually recognized by the parties as important and by the trier of fact as necessary to the first
judgment." Synanon Church, 820 F.2d at 427 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27
cmt. j (1973)). For example, if the key issue in a criminal trial is the veracity of the defendant's
alibi, that issue would be "necessary" even though it is not "ultimate." Although the Ashe court
used language indicating that collateral estoppel applies only to ultimate issues, it is far from clear
that the Court actually adheres to that view. See Synanon Church, 820 F.2d at 426. In fact, since
Ashe, the Court has stated that collateral estoppel applies to issues "necessary" to the judgment.
See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984).
59. It is unclear whether the jury found reasonable doubt that Dowling committed the bur-
glary or whether the acquittal was based on some other ground. The Court assumed, for the sake
of Dowling's argument, that there was a reasonable doubt. Id. at 672 n.2.
60. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
61. See 110 S. Ct. at 673.
62. See 110 S. Ct. at 672-73; cf. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S.
354, 362 (1984) (holding that "the difference in the relative burdens of proof in the criminal and
civil actions precludes the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel").
63. See 110 S. Ct. at 673. Dowling did not satisfy the requirements of collateral estoppel
because he failed to show that the jury in the first trial decided that he was not present at the
witness's house during the burglary. Id.
64. Id. at 675-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Brennan argued that the purpose of the double jeopardy
clause-protecting criminal defendants against harassment by an over-
zealous government-mandated that the government bears the burden
of showing that an issue it seeks to relitigate was not decided in favor of
the defendant in the previous trial.6 5 More significantly, Justice Bren-
nan concluded that collateral estoppel always should apply when facts
found in a defendant's favor at one trial are introduced as evidence of a
second offense at a later trial.66 In Justice Brennan's view, the lesser
standard of proof required at the second trial should not be relevant to
the application of the criminal collateral estoppel doctrine.6 7 He argued
that a retrial of issues places at least the same risks on the defendant
under either standard. 8 In fact, allowing the lower standard of proof at
the second trial actually increases some of the risks the double jeopardy
clause was meant to prevent.6 9 Therefore, prohibiting, on double jeop-
ardy grounds, evidence of previously tried crimes on which a defendant
won acquittal would be particularly appropriate.
70
B. Grady v. Corbin
1. Majority Opinion
Grady v. Corbin71 clearly marked a new development in double
jeopardy jurisprudence. In contrast to Dowling, Grady significantly in-
creased the protection criminal defendants may receive under the
65. Id. at 677. Justice Brennan believed that Dowling had met the burden of showing that
the jury in the first case decided that he was not involved in the burglary. Id. at 677-78. He stated
that the jury must have based its acquittal on the belief that Dowling was not a culprit in the
burglary. Id. The trial judge commented that Dowling had not seriously challenged the issue of
identity, and, according to the prosecutor, Dowling had admitted being present in the burglarized
house. However, because Dowling was acquitted of all of a wide array of charges in that case,
Justice Brennan concluded that the acquittals must have been for lack of identification because no
other grounds would have sufficed to clear him of all charges. Id.
66. Id. at 676-77.
67. Id. at 678.
68. Justice Brennan identified the following risks against which the double jeopardy clause
was meant to protect criminal defendants: an erroneous jury determination that the defendant
committed the first crime, the jury's tendency to conclude that a defendant who has committed a
certain crime is likely to repeat it or a similar crime, and the burden of mounting a second defense
against the charges for which he was acquitted. Id. at 679-80.
69. See id. If past-crimes evidence can be introduced under a lower standard of proof, it is
easier for the prosecution to raise the issue of whether the defendant committed those past crimes.
Therefore, the defendant is more likely to have to mount a second defense against accusations that
he committed past crimes than if a higher standard of proof were required. This result would
defeat the clause's objective of preventing the relitigation of charges for which the defendant has
been acquitted.
70. See id.
71. 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990). Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined in Justice
Brennan's majority opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined in Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion. Justice O'Connor filed a separate dissenting opinion.
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double jeopardy clause.7 ' Furthermore, despite its proximity to the
Dowling decision," the Grady decision casts doubt on the continued
validity of Dowling.
Corbin was charged in a New York state court with driving while
intoxicated and failing to keep to the right of the median.74 The presid-
ing judge accepted guilty pleas for both of these misdemeanors, una-
ware that the automobile accident that prompted the charges against
Corbin had resulted in the death of a passenger in the vehicle Corbin's
car had struck and that a homicide investigation was pending against
Corbin at the time he entered his pleas.75 The investigation later led to
an indictment against Corbin for reckless manslaughter, criminally neg-
ligent homicide, and third-degree reckless assault. Corbin moved to dis-
miss this indictment on double jeopardy grounds.76 The county court
denied Corbin's motion and the appellate division denied Corbin a writ
of prohibition.77 Relying on dictum in a 1980 Supreme Court decision,
Illinois v. Vitale,78 the New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the subsequent prosecution would violate the double jeopardy
clause.
7 9
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the New York Court
of Appeals. 0 Justice Brennan's majority opinion began by acknowledg-
ing that, even in the context of successive prosecutions, double jeopardy
analysis must include an application of the Blockburger test.81 Thus, if
an offense charged in a subsequent prosecution included the same stat-
utory elements as a previously tried offense, or if one of the offenses
under evaluation was a lesser included offense of the other, Blockburger
72. See Gianiny v. State, 577 A.2d 795, 797 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990).
73. Dowling was decided on January 10, 1990. Grady was decided on May 29, 1990.
74. 110 S. Ct. at 2088.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2089.
77. Id.
78. 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
79. In Vitale Justice White, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and by Justices
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, rejected the defendant's argument that the double jeopardy
clause necessarily barred his prosecution for involuntary manslaughter after an earlier conviction
for failing to reduce speed to avoid the accident that resulted in the homicide. In remanding to the
Illinois Supreme Court, however, the Court noted that, depending on the nature of the Illinois
manslaughter statute, the prosecution once again might have to prove failure to reduce speed in
order to sustain the manslaughter case. Id. at 420. "In that case, because Vitale has already been
convicted for conduct that is a necessary element of the more serious crime for which he has been
charged, his claim for double jeopardy would be substantial under Brown and our later decision in
Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977)." Id. at 420 (dictum). For a discussion of Harris and
Brown, and their applicability to these facts, see infra part IV.C.1.
80. 110 S. Ct. at 2090.
81. Id.
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automatically would bar the latter prosecution."2
The majority, however, then deviated from much of the Court's
prior double jeopardy jurisprudence and held that the Blockburger test
was only the first step in the evaluation of double jeopardy violations in
successive prosecutions.8 3 Embracing the expansion of double jeopardy
protection suggested in Vitale,"4 the Court held that, even when a sub-
sequent prosecution survives a double jeopardy challenge under Block-
burger, "the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a subsequent prosecution if,
to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecu-
tion, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for
which the defendant already has been prosecuted. '8 5 The majority
noted that the evaluation of double jeopardy violations in the context
of successive prosecutions raises concerns not sufficiently addressed by
the Blockburger test.8 6 In particular, successive prosecutions give the
government opportunities to hone its presentation of evidence and to
harass defendants.8 7 The majority stated that its newly enunciated rule
would prevent these undesirable occurrences in many situations that a
simple application of the Blockburger test could not.88 In adopting this
new rule, the majority purported not to overrule Dowling.8 9
82. Id.
83. The Grady rule is the second step of a two-step inquiry into whether successive prosecu-
tions are permissible under the clause. See United States v. Felix, 926 F.2d 1522, 1526-27 (10th
Cir.), cert. granted, 59 U.S.L.W. 3726 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1991) (No. 90-1599). In this sense, the Grady
rule is different from the Ashe and Harris rules. Although all three rules are protections against
successive prosecutions that supplement Blockburger, Ashe and Harris are considered to be pro-
tections that defendants might invoke in unusual cases, rather than separate steps that must be
analyzed in every double jeopardy inquiry in the context of successive prosecutions. See 110 S. Ct.
at 2097 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that Ashe and Harris are exceptions to the general rule and
that Blockburger constitutes the sole double jeopardy inquiry).
84. Id. at 2093. In his dissent in Grady, Justice Scalia emphasized that the Court's position
in Vitale, see supra note 79, was a mere suggestion: "We did not decide in Vitale that the second
prosecution would constitute double jeopardy if it required proof of the conduct for which Vitale
had already been convicted. We could not possibly have decided that, since the issue was not
presented on the facts before us." 110 S. Ct. at 2101 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 2087. The Court's justification for this particular rule was expressed in a single
sentence: "We believe that this analysis [the Vitale dictum] is correct and governs this case." Id. at
2090. The rest of the Court's opinion was not concerned with explaining why the clause required
this particular test. Rather, the opinion merely argued that Blockburger is not, and should not be,
the only double jeopardy test in the context of successive prosecutions. See id. at 2090-93. This
Recent Development refers to this quoted test as "the Grady rule." The term, therefore, refers
only to the second step of the two-step double jeopardy analysis; the Blockburger test is not part
of the Grady rule.
86. Although Blockburger is part of the double jeopardy protection against multiple prosecu-
tions, see id. at 2090, the test originally was developed in the context of multiple punishments
imposed in a single prosecution. Id. at 2090-91.
87. Id. at 2091-92, 2093.
88. Id. at 2093.
89. Referring to Dowling, the majority noted: "As we have held, the presentation of specific
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2. Dissenting Opinions
Justices O'Connor and Scalia filed separate dissenting opinions.9 0
Justice O'Connor's dissent emphasized that the majority's ruling con-
tradicts Dowling in many circumstances. She noted that in Dowling the
government had offered past-crimes evidence to prove identity, an es-
sential element of bank robbery, armed robbery, and, indeed, every
crime.9' Thus, she reasoned that, under the Grady rule, the facts in
Dowling presented a double jeopardy violation.92 Justice O'Connor also
expressed concern that the Grady rule called into question the contin-
ued validity of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), predicting that the ma-
jority's new rule is likely to exclude much probative evidence otherwise
admissible under Rule 404(b). 93
Justice Scalia's dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice Kennedy, 4 argued that Blockburger generally provides the only ap-
propriate test for determining whether successive prosecutions based on
the same conduct violate the double jeopardy clause. 5 Justice Scalia
noted that the Court's prior double jeopardy jurisprudence had estab-
lished only two situations in which the Court should not rely exclusively
on Blockburger-cases raising issues of criminal collateral estoppel
and cases involving the incorporation of one statutory crime into an-
other that failed to specify the former's elements.91 He argued that,
aside from these two limited exceptions, Blockburger should remain the
exclusive test for double jeopardy violations.9 8
In support of his argument, Justice Scalia first claimed that the
Blockburger test best effectuates the language of the double jeopardy
clause. 9 He then stressed that, under a proper interpretation of the
evidence in one trial does not forever prevent the government from introducing that same evidence
in a subsequent proceeding." Id. at 2093.
90. Id. at 2095-96 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2096-2105 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 2095 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 2095-96.
93. See id. at 2096. Justice O'Connor noted that the Dowling Court expressed a desire to
limit double jeopardy protection so that evidence helpful to the fact finder might be admitted. See
Dowling, 110 S. Ct. at 673.
94. Justice O'Connor approved of much of Justice Scalia's dissent. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2095
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 2097 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. See id. at 2097 (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970)).
97. See id. at 2097 (citing Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977)).
98. Id. at 2097.
99. Justice Scalia argued that at the time the Fifth Amendment was ratified, "offence"
meant the breaking of a law. Id. at 2097. Therefore, a defendant is not being prosecuted for the
same offense unless the defendant is being prosecuted for breaking the same law. Laws are not the
same if each law, i.e., criminal statute, contains an element that the other does not. It follows that
a defendant is not being prosecuted for the same offense if each criminal statute includes an ele-
ment that the other does not. See id.
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clause, all violations should be determinable before the onset of the sec-
ond trial.100 The Blockburger test, Justice Scalia noted, focused on the
charges leveled against the defendant and provided a consistent and
reliable means of making such pretrial determinations. 101 In contrast,
the new Grady rule, which focuses on the conduct to be proved at the
second trial, often would be difficult to implement at the pretrial
stage. 102 Finally, Justice Scalia argued that the history of double jeop-
ardy jurisprudence supported the notion that Blockburger generally
should be the exclusive measure of protection under the clause. 10
Justice Scalia attacked the Grady rule as a de facto abandonment
of the long-accepted views and precedent embodied in Blockburger. He
noted the lack of precedent for the Grady rule20 4 and what Justice
Scalia perceived as the new rule's inconsistency with the Dowling deci-
sion. ' 5 In addition, Justice Scalia criticized what he predicted would be
the rule's practical effect. He surmised that, when multiple charges
arise from a single criminal act, the Grady rule effectively would require
the government to bring all charges related to that act in a single
proceeding. 06
100. Justice Scalia rejects the notion that "jeopardy" refers to convictions or sentences. He
believes that it refers to standing trial. Thus, being "twice put in jeopardy" can refer only to
standing trial a second time. Id. Support exists for this view. See supra note 26 and accompanying
text. Violations of a rule that prohibits the very act of a second trial cannot be identified or caused
by what occurs at the second trial, but rather should be apparent before that trial. 110 S.Ct. at
2097-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. 110 S. Ct. at 2097-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Determining whether Blockburger has been
violated requires no more than a comparison of the elements of statutes under which the defend-
ant has been prosecuted. Id. at 2093.
102. For a discussion of the applicability of Grady after the pretrial stage, see infra part
IV.D.1.
103. Justice Scalia argued that the clause had its roots in two English common-law pleas,
auterfoits acquit and auterfoits convict, which were substantial only against successive prosecu-
tions for crimes with identical elements, even if based on the same act. Thus, the origins of Anglo-
American law indicate that Blockburger should be the exclusive definition of "same offense" in the
context of successive prosecutions. See id. at 2098-2101.
104. Justice Scalia pointed to the majority's admission that Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410
(1980), did not rule on the issue that the Grady court confronted. See supra note 84. Justice Scalia
further argued that the Vitale court, even in dictum, did not necessarily endorse the rule adopted
by the Grady court:
[W]e did not even say in Vitale, by way of dictum, that such a prosecution would violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause. We said only that a claim to that effect would be "substantial,"
deferring to another day the question whether it would be successful, That day is today, and
we should answer the question no.
110 S. Ct. at 2101 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia then refuted the idea that the cases cited in
Vitale might, as the majority claimed, make the argument in question "substantial." See id. at
2101-02. For an argument that Justice Scalia was correct on this point, see infra part IV.C.1.
105. 110 S. Ct. at 2102. See also infra part IV.C.2.
106. See 110 S. Ct. at 2102-03. The Court specifically has rejected such a requirement in
Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 790 (1985). Accord Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2094 n.15. Justice
Brennan, however, has advocated the use of a "same transaction" test since 1970. See Ashe v.
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Justice Scalia concluded his dissent by criticizing the majority for
placing illusory limitations on its new rule. 10 7 He acknowledged that the
majority had attempted to phrase the rule in a way that would allow
courts to exclude some, but not all, evidence of prior offenses for which
defendant had been prosecuted previously. 0 8 Nevertheless, Justice
Scalia argued, because the rule prohibited all evidence introduced for
the purpose of proving an essential element of a crime charged in a
second prosecution, and because all relevant evidence at a criminal trial
is aimed at establishing an essential element of a crime charged, 10 9 the
rule actually would exclude all relevant evidence of past crimes for
which a defendant had been prosecuted previously. 110 Thus, the major-
ity's apparent limitation on the exclusionary force of its rule through
the essential element requirement created, in fact, no limitation at all.
Evidence not excluded under the essential element language should be
excluded on relevancy grounds anyway."'
Justice Scalia also criticized the other limiting principle found in
the language of the rule-that only evidence that proves conduct con-
stituting an offense for which the defendant has been prosecuted vio-
lates the double jeopardy clause." 2 He argued that this language might
allow prosecutors to use some of the facts relevant to the prior crime, as
long as those facts fall short of proving the entire prior offense. 113 If the
Grady rule permits the prosecution to manipulate its proof in this fash-
ion, however, then the rule fails to serve its two purposes-to avoid
placing the burden of a second prosecution on defendants and to pre-
vent the prosecution from rehearsing its case in the first prosecution." 4
Swenson, 397 U.S 436, 453-54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S.
376, 387-88 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia believed that the Grady rule is a dis-
guised form of the same transaction test, but Justice Brennan denied this accusation. See Grady,
110 S. Ct. at 2094 & n.15. Although Grady increases the possibility that a double jeopardy viola-
tion will occur if crimes arising out of the same transaction are not prosecuted in one proceeding,
Grady does permit, in some instances, multiple prosecutions for crimes arising out of a single
transaction. See id. at 2094.
107. 110 S. Ct. at 2102-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108. Under the Grady rule, repetitive proof violates the clause only if that proof will be
introduced "to establish an essential element of an offense charged in [the subsequent] prosecu-
tion." Id. at 2093.
109. Evidence in a criminal trial is irrelevant and, thus, inadmissible unless it pertains to
guilt. See 110 S. Ct. at 2103. All evidence pertaining to guilt is aimed at establishing an essential
element of the crime charged. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 (1979); United States v.
Hall, 653 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981). Thus, all relevant evidence tends to establish an
essential element of a crime charged.
110. 110 S. Ct. at 2103 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. See id. at 2103.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2104. For a discussion of the accuracy of this interpretation of the Grady rule, see
infra text accompanying notes 172-73.
114. 110 S. Ct. at 2103 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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In addition, Justice Scalia suggested that the Grady rule might provide
an incentive to defense counsel to introduce evidence of prior conduct
for which their clients had been prosecuted, in a manner sufficient to
create a double jeopardy violation.' 5 Finally, Justice Scalia criticized
the potential of the Grady rule to disrupt the trial process. Not only
might the rule force trial judges to make periodic double jeopardy eval-
uations throughout a trial, but it also would force judges to terminate a
trial as soon as a Grady violation became apparent."'
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Grady: A Definition of "Same Offense" or a Component of the
Double Jeopardy Concept?
In analyzing Grady one must first identify exactly what the Grady
rule is, and what it is not. Contrary to the way some commentators
have characterized the rule, 17 it is not merely a means of defining the
"same offense" language found in the double jeopardy clause. Rather,
the Grady rule is a test for determining whether a double jeopardy vio-
lation exists."' This distinction is significant because it indicates the
revitalization of an expansive view of double jeopardy rights, which this
Recent Development refers to as the "double jeopardy concept." 119
Although the majority could have included a "same offense" defini-
tion somewhere within the Grady rule, it did not do so, either explicitly
or implicitly. Nowhere in its opinion did the Grady majority refer to its
rule as a definition of "same offense," nor did the majority point to any
part of its rule intended to determine whether the prosecutions in ques-
tion involved the same offense. 120 Instead, the majority merely declared
that the rule was an appropriate test for when successive prosecutions
violate the double jeopardy clause.2 ' By its terms, the rule is a com-
plete description of double jeopardy violations in this context.'22 The
115. Id. at 2104.
116. Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 214-16.
117. See, e.g., James M. Herrick, Note, Double Jeopardy Analysis Comes Home: The "Same
Conduct" Standard in Grady v. Corbin, 79 Ky. L.J. 847 (1991); Sara Barton, Case Comment,
Grady v. Corbin, An Unsuccessful Effort to Define "Same Offense," 25 GA. L. REV. 143 (1990).
118. See Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2093. See also infra note 122 and accompanying text.
119. The Author coined this term to facilitate discussion. For a further explanation of the
double jeopardy concept, see infra note 133.
120. The Court did state that Blockburger is not the exclusive definition of "same offense" in
the context of successive prosecutions. 110 S. Ct. at 2091 n.8. The Court did not explain, however,
how its rule affected the definition of "same offense." Thus, while the first part of the two-step
double jeopardy inquiry-the Blockburger test-is a definition of "same offense," see Grady, 110
S. Ct. at 2096 (Scalia, J., dissenting), the second step-the Grady rule-is not.
121. 110 S. Ct. at 2093.
122. The Grady rule begins, "the Double Jeopardy Clause bars ...." Id. Even one com-
mentator who described Grady as a definition of "same offense" acknowledged that the rule actu-
1991]
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Grady rule, therefore, is more than a mere definition of "same offense"
because the existence of a double jeopardy violation depends on more
than a "same offense" finding.
2 3
Some commentators apparently have assumed that the Grady
Court implicitly indicated that "same offense" means "same con-
duct.' 1 24 It is, however, simply inaccurate to say that Grady substitutes
the word "conduct" for the word "offense" in the double jeopardy
clause. Grady does not prohibit the introduction of the same conduct in
all successive prosecutions; nor does it prohibit successive prosecutions
for the same illegal conduct in all situations.125 Furthermore, the rule
provides no mechanism for determining whether successive prosecu-
tions were for the same offense. 26 Therefore, the Grady rule apparently
requires no threshold finding of a same offense before finding a double
jeopardy violation.
ally "defined the standard for determining what constitutes double jeopardy." Note, supra note
117, at 847.
123. Double jeopardy also depends upon the existence of "jeopardy," see, e.g., United States
v. Pitts, 569 F.2d 343, 346 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 959 (1978), "same offense," see, e.g.,
Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218, 225-26 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975), and "twice,"
see, e.g., People ex rel. Fernandez v. Kaiser, 230 A.D. 646, 648, 246 N.Y.S. 309, 311 (3d Dep't
1930). A double jeopardy determination also conceivably could depend upon defining "life or
limb." See George C. Thomas III, A Modest Proposal to Save the Double Jeopardy Clause, 69
WASH. U. L.Q. 195 (1991).
124. See sources cited supra note 117.
125. Grady prohibits the use of some prior culpable conduct, but not the use of any prior
innocent conduct. See Thomas, supra note 123, at 195. Nevertheless, a substantial amount of prior
culpable conduct still may be admissible under Grady. See infra text accompanying note 173;
United States v. Felix, 926 F.2d 1522, 1533 (10th Cir.) (Anderson, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 59
U.S.L.W. 3726 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1991) (No. 90-1599).
126. Such a determination would require identifying a set of facts in the first proceeding that
matches a set of facts in the second prosecution. If a set of identical facts can be categorized as an
offense under any reasonable definition of the term, then both prosecutions involved the same
offense. For example, Blockburger requires that the court identify a set of statutory elements for
the crime charged in the first prosecution that are identical to a set of statutory elements for the
crime charged in the second prosecution. A set of criminal statutory elements comports with a
reasonable definition of offense, so a court properly may find that the successive prosecutions were
for the same offense.
For the Grady rule to apply, however, the only set of facts that must be the same in both
prosecutions is certain culpable conduct. Although culpable conduct easily fits within a sensible
definition of offense, the Grady rule complicates the evaluation process. Even if the culpable con-
duct present in both prosecutions is the same, the rule does not apply unless two other conditions
are met. First, the conduct introduced in the second prosecution must have constituted an offense
charged in the first prosecution. Second, the conduct must be offered to establish an essential
element of a crime charged in the second prosecution. The failure of either of these conditions
means that there is no violation of the Grady rule. Presumably, then, failure of a condition means
that the sameness of the conduct has vanished, because nothing else has occurred to take the
situation out of the ambit of the double jeopardy clause. The odd requirements of the Grady rule
work to divest offenses of their sameness for reasons totally unrelated to why the offenses are
called the same in the first place. Grady, therefore, does not indicate any reliable means of identi-
fying a set of identical facts that properly may be called same offenses.
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The Grady Court's failure to require a same offense finding marks
a changing view of the nature of double jeopardy protection. Although
historically the Court never appeared certain about the clause's exact
requirements, it at least assumed that the answer should be based on
the words of the clause.127 Although the Justices disputed about how
strictly the constitutional text should be construed, " 8 they generally
agreed that the applicable rule was that no one could be put twice in
jeopardy for the same offense, whatever that meant.12 9
In Ashe v. Swenson,13 0 however, the Court replaced the language of
the double jeopardy clause with the double jeopardy concept. 131 The
double jeopardy clause contains language for the Court to interpret,
whether or not in a sincere or skillful manner,82 in order to define
double jeopardy rights. In contrast, the double jeopardy concept com-
prises general premises about what the government should and should
127. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 185 (1957) (stating that "this case presents a
serious question concerning the meaning and application of that provision of the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution which declares that no person shall '. . . be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb' "); Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 341-42 (1911)
(holding that "[i]t is to be observed that the protection intended and specifically given is against
second jeopardy for the same offense"). This focus on the words of the clause was completely
absent in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), and Grady. See Ashe (incorporating criminal
collateral estoppel into the clause without quoting the words of the clause even a single time);
Grady (creating another double jeopardy test, but mentioning the language of the clause only in a
single footnote).
128. In Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), for example, a defendant was charged
with first degree murder and convicted of the lesser included offense of second degree murder. He
subsequently appealed that conviction, which was overturned. Although a new trial for second
degree murder would not have violated the double jeopardy clause, the Court held that a new trial
for first degree murder would violate the clause because the conviction of a lesser included offense
is an implied acquittal of the greater offense. Id. at 190. Although the Court and the dissent dis-
agreed about how strictly the language of the clause should be construed and about what historical
references supported either construction, the language of the clause was always at the forefront of
the debate. See id. (holding that the "second trial for first degree murder placed [the defendant] in
jeopardy twice for the same offense in violation of the Constitution"); id. at 198 (observing that
"[tihe right not to be placed in jeopardy more than once for the same offense is a vital safeguard in
our society"); id. at 206 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting that statutory language, which had
failed to support a double jeopardy claim in a previous case having facts similar to Green, was
"substantially identical with that in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, upon which the
petitioner" relied).
129. See supra note 128. See also United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896) (stating
that "the prohibition is not against being twice punished, but against being twice put in jeop-
ardy"); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 188 (1889) (holding that "the test is not, whether the defend-
ant has already been tried for the same act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same
offence") (quoting Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871)).
130. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
131. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
132. The Author does not claim that the Court shows a lesser inclination to cloak judicial fiat
in the guise of textual interpretation when confronted with a double jeopardy issue than when
confronted with any other issue.
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not be able do to persons. 133 When the Court justifies rules based on
these premises, it generally cites the double jeopardy clause but fails to
demonstrate any concrete relationship between these premises and any
specific language in the clause.' When acting in furtherance of the
double jeopardy concept, the Court decides that the double jeopardy
clause has been violated without specifically identifying how a person
has been put twice in jeopardy for the same offense.
In Ashe, for example, the Court held that no matter what issue a
criminal defendant would have to litigate, the clause embodies the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel, 135 not because the absence of collateral es-
toppel would put defendants twice in jeopardy for the same offense, but
because it would force the defendants to "run the gauntlet" a second
time.38' In fact, no reasonable construction of the language of the clause
indicates that the Constitution requires the application of collateral es-
toppel in every case.137 The Court, however, did not consult the lan-
133. The double jeopardy concept is a general belief that defendants have certain rights that
ensure that the government is not able to do certain things to them more than once. The concept
relies upon the double jeopardy clause as a basis for making such rights constitutionally required.
The reason for invoking the double jeopardy clause, rather than some other constitutional provi-
sion, is that the clause also refers to the government not being able to do certain things to a
defendant more than once. Therefore, it appears much more appropriate to argue that the rights
are inherent in the double jeopardy clause than in some other constitutional provision. Compare
Ashe (holding that criminal collateral estoppel is embodied in the double jeopardy clause) with
Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958) (holding that criminal collateral estoppel is not embodied
in the due process clause). A closer examination of the clause might indicate that no conceivable
interpretation of its language supports finding such a right. If, however, the Court cites the double
jeopardy clause, but not its specific language, the Court hides this fallacy, and the double jeopardy
protection henceforth includes that right.
The concept is much broader than the clause. Whereas the clause only prevents the govern-
ment from putting a defendant twice in jeopardy for the same offense, the concept prevents the
government from doing a wide range of things to defendant more than once. To the extent that the
government might do things to a person that cannot reasonably be categorized as putting that
person in jeopardy, the concept creates rights that simply should not be found in the clause.
134. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
135. 397 U.S. at 445.
136. 397 U.S. at 446. Collateral estoppel remains a component of double jeopardy protection.
Dowling v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 668 (1990), did not change this rule. In fact, the Dowling
Court reaffirmed Ashe, but held that collateral estoppel did not apply under the facts of Dowling.
Id. at 672-73.
137. Criminal collateral estoppel prevents the government from forcing a defendant to reliti-
gate an ultimate issue on which he was successful at a previous trial. When such an issue involves
anything that reasonably could be called an offense, such as defendant's prior bad conduct, collat-
eral estoppel might protect a defendant from twice being put in jeopardy for the same offense, as
that term might reasonably be defined. For example, suppose a defendant was acquitted of a com-
mitting a bizarre signature crime. Subsequently, the same defendant is tried for committing an-
other crime with the same bizarre signature-a crime that occurred 100 miles away and 5 hours
after the first crime. Collateral estoppel would not permit the prosecution to force the defendant to
relitigate the issue of whether he perpetrated the prior crime. What is the same in the first and
second prosecutions is the issue: whether defendant committed the first offense. A "yes" answer to
that question in the second trial after acquittal in the first certainly jeopardizes the defendant by
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guage of the clause, but instead chose to rely on the "run the gauntlet"
language to delineate the scope of double jeopardy rights. Under Ashe,
then, the double jeopardy clause clearly became more than a guarantee
against being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense.
13
Grady also is grounded in the double jeopardy concept. The major-
ity failed to consider whether the clause required the formulation of a
new rule to prevent persons from being put twice in jeopardy for the
same offense.139 Instead, the Court justified the rule on the basis that it
supposedly honors the values embodied in the double jeopardy
clause. 140 The majority demonstrated little concern about whether the
language of the clause is reasonably susceptible to such an
interpretation.
B. Grady's Break with Precedent
1. The Inapplicability of Harris and Brown
The Grady majority characterized its rule' as an application of
Brown v. Ohio"'2 and Harris v. Oklahoma."13 These decisions, however,
fail to justify the result in Grady v. Brown, which invalidated a prose-
cution for a greater offense after a conviction for the lesser offense,1
44
making his conviction at the second trial more likely. Thus, collateral estoppel in this case argua-
bly prohibits defendant from being "put twice in jeopardy for the same offense."
Suppose, however, that the only contested issue in the first trial was identity, and the defend-
ant's defense was alibi, for example, that he was in New Zealand at the time. Suppose further that
it is clear that the jury acquitted the defendant because it believed his alibi. Under the "essential"
or "necessary" formulation, collateral estoppel prevents the prosecution from relitigating the nar-
row issue of whether defendant was in New Zealand on that day. See supra note 58 (discussing the
various formulations of the collateral estoppel inquiry). If the defendant had been forced to reliti-
gate the issue, however, it simply cannot be said that he is being put in jeopardy for the same
offense. There might be jeopardy at the second trial, and issues that are the same, but there is no
offense common to both trial-unless being in New Zealand is a crime.
138. Ashe is significant in the development of the double jeopardy concept because it showed
the Court's willingness to ignore the language of the clause when formulating double jeopardy law.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel itself, however, is not a very significant addition to the double
jeopardy protection available under Blockburger, because it will fail in many cases to bar a second
prosecution even when it bars relitigation of a certain issue. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 374
n.318.
139. The Court discussed the need for more protection against successive prosecutions, but
neglected to state why its particular test effectuated the language of the double jeopardy clause.
See supra note 85. Interestingly, the Court mentioned the language of the clause only once, in a
footnote. See Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2087 n.1.
140. See 110 S. Ct. at 2090-93.
141. See 110 S. Ct. at 2090 (quoting Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 420 (1980)).
142. 432 U.S. 161 (1977). In December 1973 defendant Brown was charged with joyriding. He
pleaded guilty to the charge and served 30 days in jail. Id. at 162. In February of 1974, Brown was
charged with auto theft arising out of the same events that led to his joyriding conviction. Id. at
162-63. Joyriding was a lesser included offense of auto theft under Ohio law. Id. at 168.
143. 433 U.S. 682 (1977). For a discussion of the facts of Harris, see supra note 41.
144. Brown, 432 U.S. at 169.
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depended only on a straightforward application of Blockburger,145 and
the Court has emphasized that Brown was not meant to bar a second
prosecution in any other situation.146 Brown is simply a convenient il-
lustration of the Blockburger test and provides defendants no further
protection. In contrast, the Grady majority freely admitted that, under
Blockburger, the second prosecution in Grady did not violate the
double jeopardy clause. 147 Harris also fails to justify the result in
Grady. Harris, like Brown, was decided in the context of successive
prosecutions for greater and lesser crimes-felony murder and the un-
derlying felony.148 Unlike Brown, however, Harris did not follow di-
rectly from Blockburger.
The felony murder statute at issue in Harris did not require proof
of any particular felony; the state had proved robbery with a firearm,
but proof of any felony would have sufficed. 149 Thus, Blockburger tech-
nically would not have barred the subsequent prosecution.6 0 Suppose,
however, that the legislature had chosen to define felony murder in a
series of statutes, each of which required proof of a particular felony.
Blockburger then would bar prosecution for the underlying felony after
prosecution for felony murder. Therefore, had the Court not acknowl-
edged an exception, the Blockburger rule would have allowed an evis-
ceration of Harris's constitutional protection merely because the
legislature decided to include all underlying felonies in a single felony
murder statute. Harris prevents this absurd result and, therefore,
blocks legislative shortcuts around the dictates of Blockburger in the
context of successive prosecutions. 15'
To reach this result, the Harris Court relied solely on Ex parte
145. See id. at 168.
146. See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 787 (1985) (observing that Brown involved
the "classically simple" situation of prosecutions for greater and lesser offenses). The Grady Court
cited a footnote from the Brown opinion in order to show that Brown supported the Grady rule.
See Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2092 (quoting Brown, 432 U.S. at 166-67 n.6 (1977)). The footnote, how-
ever, does not support the adoption of the Grady rule. Not only is the footnote merely dictum, it
does not recommend the creation of any additional double jeopardy protection beyond that al-
ready available at the time. Instead, the footnote simply discussed Ashe and Nielsen and recog-
nizes that both are settled double jeopardy law. Far from suggesting that the Court should create
additional protection, the footnote concedes that the Court "need not decide whether the repeti-
tion of proof required by the successive prosecutions against Brown would otherwise entitle him to
the additional protection offered by Ashe and Nielsen." Brown, 432 U.S. at 167 n.6.
147. The defendant conceded this point. 110 S. Ct. at 2094.
148. Harris, 433 U.S. at 682.
149. See Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2097 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. See supra note 41.
151. Although legislatures may evade Blockburger's prohibition against multiple punish-
ments if they so intend, see supra text accompanying notes 30-32, legislatures cannot impinge
similarly upon double jeopardy rights in the context of successive prosecutions. See Thomas, supra
note 32, at 107.
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Nielsen,152 which held that a person convicted for a crime containing
various elements cannot be tried again for one of those elements.
153
Harris, relying on Nielsen, accomplished essentially the same result as
had Brown, relying on Blockburger-a prohibition of successive prose-
cutions for greater and lesser offenses.5 Thus, although Harris does
not follow from a rigid application of Blockburger, it is closely related
to Blockburger because Harris focuses directly on the elements of the
crimes charged in each prosecution. 55 In contrast, the Grady rule pur-
posefully avoids focusing on the elements of the prior prosecution. 5 6
Therefore, the Grady and Harris tests are dissimilar, and Harris does
not support the result in Grady.
57
152. 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
153. Id. at 188-89 (using the term "incident" as a synonym of "statutory element"). In Niel-
sen the defendant first was convicted of cohabiting with two wives over a two-and-one-half-year
period. Subsequently, he was prosecuted and convicted for committing adultery with one of the
wives one day after the period of cohabitation ended. The Court held that the double jeopardy
clause barred the second prosecution. Id. at 187.
154. Harris, 433 U.S. at 682. Nielsen and Blockburger both prohibit successive prosecutions
for greater and lesser included offenses. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 168. The difference in the two
cases is the manner in which the Court was willing to classify offenses as "greater" and "lesser
included." A lesser included offense is one that requires no proof beyond that necessary for convic-
tion of another offense-the greater offense. Id. Therefore, whether offenses constitute greater and
lesser included offenses depends upon the proof required for conviction under each offense. The
Blockburger test requires the court to examine the statutory elements of an offense to determine
what proof it requires. Id. at 166. In Nielsen, however, the Court showed a willingness to look
beyond the statutory language defining the offenses to determine what proof the statutes actually
required for conviction. See Nielsen, 131 U.S. at 189.
155. Harris ensures that a prosecution under a statute that incorporates a lesser offense can-
not avoid the dictates of Blockburger merely because of peculiarities in the way the statute defin-
ing the greater offense refers to the lesser offense. See supra text accompanying notes 149-51. A
lesser included offense is one whose elements are a subset of the elements of the greater offense.
Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989) (decided in the context of jury instructions); see
also United States v. Schmuck, 840 F.2d 384, 388 (7th Cir. 1988), af'd, 489 U.S. 705 (1989) (noting
that the definition is the same for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis). Whether one offense
is proved by the evidence adduced in proof of another offense has nothing to do with whether the
former is a lesser included offense of the latter. See Schmuck, 840 F.2d at 388. Lesser included
offense refers to elements of crimes charged, not conduct used to prove them. Id.
Thomas, supra note 2, argues that Nielsen was concerned with the conduct used to prove the
prior offense. Id. at 344. It is, in fact, difficult to determine the exact basis for Nielsen. See id.
Harris, however, relied only on those portions of the Nielsen opinion that proscribed successive
prosecutions for greater and lesser offenses. Harris, 433 U.S. at 682-83. In Harris the Court deter-
mined the existence of greater and lesser offenses by examining the elements of the statutes in-
volved. Id. Therefore, even if Nielsen was concerned with what conduct was proved at the previous
prosecution, Harris was concerned with the statutory elements of the two prosecutions.
156. See Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2093.
157. The Grady Court declared that its rule was necessary because "a technical comparison
of the elements of the two offenses as required by Blockburger does not protect defendants suffi-
ciently from the burdens of multiple trials." 110 S. Ct. at 2093.
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2. Grady's Tension with Dowling
Not only is Grady unsupported by the Court's earlier double jeop-
ardy jurisprudence; it also is difficult to reconcile with Dowling v.
United States,158 which the Court decided less than five months before
Grady. The Grady Court, however, refused to overrule Dowling
overtly.15 9 Nevertheless, either Grady overrules Dowling de facto, or
Dowling, if it remains intact, places significant limitations on Grady.
Simple juxtaposition of the two cases reveals the uneasiness of
their coexistence. Dowling held that the double jeopardy clause did not
bar the admission of evidence of a defendant's participation in past
crimes for which defendant previously had been acquitted, as long as
the jury in the second trial could find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the past crimes had occurred and that the defendant was the
culprit. 60 Grady held that the double jeopardy clause bars a subse-
quent prosecution in which the government, to prove an essential ele-
ment of an offense charged in the subsequent prosecution, will prove
conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has previ-
ously been prosecuted.' One might rephrase the Grady rule as follows:
the introduction of evidence of conduct that constitutes an offense for
which the defendant has previously been prosecuted violates the double
jeopardy clause when that evidence is intended to establish an essential
element of a crime charged in a subsequent prosecution. 62 In Dowling
the government introduced the burglary victim's testimony to prove
identity,16 3 an essential element of any crime. Thus, it appears that,
under the Grady rule, the introduction of the testimony at issue vio-
lated the clause if the testimony proved conduct constituting an offense
for which Dowling had previously been prosecuted.'
6 4
The Grady majority attempted to distinguish Dowling by portray-
ing this testimony as evidence comprising something less than evidence
proving conduct constituting an offense for which Dowling previously
had been prosecuted.6 5 An examination of Dowling, however, does not
reveal such a clear distinction. First, the prosecution may have
proved16 6 conduct by Dowling sufficient to satisfy each element of bur-
158. 110 S. Ct. 668 (1990).
159. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
160. 110 S. Ct. at 672.
161. 110 S. Ct. at 2093.
162. Grady operates as a restriction on the evidence that the prosecution can introduce at a
trial rather than as a prohibition against having the trial at all. See 110 S. Ct. at 2094. See also
infra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
163. See 110 S. Ct. at 670.
164. This follows from a straightforward application of Grady.
165. See 110 S. Ct. at 2093.
166. For a discussion of the problems presented in defining "prove" for the purposes of
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glary, a crime for which Dowling was prosecuted in the earlier trial. 1"
Admittedly, the Dowling Court referred to the testimony in question as
evidence relating to prior conduct that the prosecution failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt in the earlier trial.168 The essence of Dow-
ling, however, is the difference between proving conduct beyond a rea-
sonable doubt and proving it under a lower standard of proof.6 " The
Dowling Court easily might have concluded that, under the lower stan-
dard,170 the witness's testimony did prove conduct constituting the en-
tire burglary offense. Therefore, Grady distinguished Dowling by
making unsupported assumptions about what the Dowling Court de-
cided. Dowling prescribed what evidence may be introduced at trial,
without considering whether that evidence proved conduct.17'
If the Grady Court correctly distinguished Dowling because the
prosecution in Dowling did not prove all of the conduct necessary to
constitute an offense, Grady's impact would be limited significantly.
The prosecution easily could avoid the dictates of Grady by omitting
just enough evidence to avoid proving some of the conduct necessary to
constitute the entirety of an offense. 172 Apparently, such tactics can
succeed. Several courts already have held that, although the prosecu-
tion introduced evidence of a past crime, it did not prove all of the
conduct constituting the crime and, therefore, did not violate the Grady
rule. 173
Grady, see id. at 2104 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167. The Virgin Islands burglary statute requires proof of breaking and entering a dwelling
in which there is, at that time, a human being. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 442 (1964). The witness,
Ms. Henry, specifically testified that this occurred. 110 S. Ct. at 670. In addition, the statute re-
quires that defendant be armed with a dangerous weapon or be assisted by a confederate actually
present. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 442. Henry testified that Dowling carried a handgun and entered
her home with an accomplice. 110 S. Ct. at 670. Ms. Henry, however, may not have testified to the
final element of burglary, intent to commit an offense in the dwelling, V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 442.
Nevertheless, a jury easily could have inferred such intent. See, e.g., Frazier v. State, 567 So. 2d
879, 880 (Ala. 1990).
168. See Dowling, 110 S. Ct. at 673.
169. See id. at 672.
170. As Justice Scalia pointed out, the Grady rule fails to specify what threshold of proof is
necessary to trigger a Grady violation. See Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2104 (Scalia, J., dissenting). There-
fore, proving conduct under a lower standard of proof well may constitute a Grady violation.
171. No basis exists for believing that the Dowling Court even thought about whether evi-
dence otherwise acceptable would become unconstitutional if it proved certain conduct. The Court
held that evidence of the prior burglary was admissible and did not even discuss the possibility
that its admissibility might depend upon the conduct that the evidence was intended to prove.
172. 110 S. Ct. at 2103 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173. See United States v. White, 936 F.2d 1326, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 60
U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1991) (No. 91-516); United States v. Rivera-Feliciano, 930 F.2d 951,
954 (1st Cir. 1991). Although lower appellate courts have reversed numerous convictions under
Grady, the trials in these cases occurred before the Court decided Grady, when prosecutors could
not anticipate the requirements Grady would soon impose. E.g., United States v. Felix, 926 F.2d
1522 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 59 U.S.L.W. 3726 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1991) (No. 90-1599); Anderson v.
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In sum, the Grady Court committed one of two errors in its at-
tempt to distinguish Dowling. Either the Court left Grady in direct
conflict with Dowling,' or it failed to bar much evidence of past crimes
for which defendant has already been prosecuted, thereby frustrating
its own attempts to increase double jeopardy rights.
17 5
C. Redefining Double Jeopardy Rights in the Context of Successive
Prosecutions
Although Grady is cast in the form of a very specific holding, the
rule in fact reflects a general view of defendants' rights with respect to
successive prosecutions. 17 6 With Grady, the Court purportedly has set-
tled two crucial and previously uncertain issues concerning the double
jeopardy clause. First, the Court has decided that, in some situations, a
defendant cannot be put twice in jeopardy for the same conduct.1'7 Sec-
ond, the Court clearly has decided that Blockburger inadequately pro-
tects defendants from the burdens of multiple prosecutions.17 8
1. Adopting the Vitale Dictum
Since 1970 the Supreme Court has become more receptive to ex-
panding defendants' guarantee against successive prosecutions. 79 By
the time the Court decided Vitale v. Illinois, s° it already had em-
barked on a discernable trend toward developing bars to successive
prosecutions in addition to Blockburger.18' The dictum in Vitale'1
2
clearly indicated that some members of the Court would consider ex-
panding the prohibition against successive prosecutions.' These mem-
bers proposed limiting the government's ability to use evidence of the
same illicit conduct in successive trials.' They reasoned that the gov-
ernment should not be able to use conduct for which the defendant had
State, 570 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1990); State v. Hoskinson, 559 N.E.2d 11 (IlM. 1990); Harrelson v.
State, 569 So. 2d 295 (Miss. 1990); State v. Harrington, 461 N.W.2d 752 (Neb. 1990).
174. See 110 S. Ct. at 2095-96 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But see Felix, 926 F.2d at 1528
(proposing that "Dowling and Grady hre not contradictory and we can, and must, give full applica-
tion to both holdings").
175. See 110 S. Ct. at 2103 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Grady Court intended its rule to
protect defendants from forced relitigation concerning the same conduct. See id.
176. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
177. 110 S. Ct. at 2087.
178. Id. at 2093.
179. See Harris v. Oklahoma, 432 U.S. 682 (1977); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
180. 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
181. See Harris, 433 U.S. 682; Ashe, 397 U.S. 436.
182. See supra note 79.
183. Vitale, 447 U.S. at 420.
184. This is a noticeable departure from Blockburger, which focuses not on conduct, but on
statutory elements. See Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2097 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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already been convicted to prove an essential element of a crime charged
in a subsequent prosecution. 18 5 Although the rule had yet to be ac-
cepted by a majority of the Supreme Court, several federal and state
courts adopted the extra safeguard suggested in Vitale. 8s In addition,
the Court vacated a judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court that de-
nied a defendant's double jeopardy claim and remanded the case in
light of Vitale.187 Nevertheless, despite at least two opportunities to
adopt the Vitale dictum in the 1980s, the Court elected not to resolve
the issue.188
In sum, although the Grady rule did not follow directly from the
Court's prior holdings, it was not completely unexpected,8 9 particularly
given the Court's growing recognition of the different interests impli-
cated in multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments. 90 Presented
with facts that enabled it to adopt the Vitale dictum,'9 ' the Grady ma-
jority resolved, or attempted to resolve, an issue that had been troub-
ling the Court for years.'92
2. Protecting Against the Burdens of Successive Prosecutions
In Ashe913 and Harris'" the Court recognized distinctions between
successive prosecutions and multiple punishments for the purposes of
the double jeopardy analysis. 95 In neither case, however, did the Court
185. 447 U.S. at 420. This is basically the rule adopted in Grady.
186. See, e.g., Roberts v. Thigpen, 693 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1982), afl'd, 468 U.S. 27 (1984);
People v. Lowe, 660 P.2d 1261, 1267 (Colo. 1983) (stating that the Blockburger test is not disposi-
tive in light of the new approach offered by Vitale).
187. Burroughs v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 903 (1980). In Burroughs the defendant was convicted
for disorderly conduct arising out of an attack on a police officer. Subsequently, the state sought to
prosecute defendant for battery arising out of the same incident. Citing Brown, the Georgia Su-
preme Court applied the Blockburger test, found no double jeopardy violation, and denied the
defendant's claim. State v. Burroughs, 260 S.E.2d 5, 7-8 (Ga. 1979). On remand from the United
States Supreme Court, the Georgia court held that, under Vitale, the double jeopardy clause bars
a successive prosecution if one crime proves an element of the other crime. State v. Burroughs, 271
S.E.2d 629, 630 (Ga. 1980).
188. The Grady majority noted that "[t]his issue has been raised before us twice in recent
years without resolution." Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2087 n.2 (citing Fugate v. New Mexico, 470 U.S. 904
(1985) and Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27 (1984)).
189. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 382-83 (noting that, as of 1986, the Supreme Court had
been moving steadily towards embracing the Vitale dictum).
190. See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166-67 n.6 (1977).
191. See Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2090.
192. See Note, supra note 117, at 852-54 (discussing the Court's indecision regarding succes-
sive prosecutions during this period).
193. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
194. Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977).
195. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text. Clearly, these cases acknowledged rights
that exist only in the context of successive prosecutions. By its terms, criminal collateral estoppel
applies only to multiple prosecutions. Harris acknowledged the prohibition against successive pros-
ecutions for a greater and a lesser offense.
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find it necessary to expand double jeopardy protection beyond that pro-
vided by Blockburger in order to relieve defendants of the burdens of
successive prosecutions. The Court's incorporation of the criminal col-
lateral estoppel doctrine into the clause helps defendants only when the
prosecution seeks to relitigate an issue decided in a defendant's favor
during an earlier prosecution.""6 Thus, Ashe focused primarily on al-
lowing defendants to rely upon prior acquittals, not on shielding de-
fendants from the onus of a subsequent prosecution.197 Nor did Harris
represent a significant expansion of Blockburger. Harris merely pre-
vents legislatures from evading Blockburger's prohibition against suc-
cessive prosecutions by drafting general felony murder statutes rather
than felony murder statutes that refer to specific felonies. 98
Prior to Grady, therefore, the Court found it unnecessary to pro-
vide defendants with protection against the burdens of multiple prose-
cutions beyond that provided by a fair reading of Blockburger.99 The
Grady majority found otherwise. Under Grady the double jeopardy
clause now offers criminal defendants more protection from the burdens
of successive prosecutions.
D. The Aftermath of Grady
1. The Application of the Grady Rule to Evidence Already
Introduced
One of the most important developments in the lower courts' ef-
forts to implement the Grady rule is the courts' assumption that the
rule applies to evidence already introduced at the second trial. This is
an important assumption because, by its terms, the Grady rule applies
only preemptively.200 The rule itself refers only to pretrial situations
196. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 446. Under collateral estoppel, a prior adjudication on an issue during
a valid proceeding is binding in the future between the same parties. Id. at 443. Obviously, defend-
ants would not invoke collateral estoppel unless the court in the first proceeding found the issue in
their favor, because otherwise they would not wish to be bound by that determination.
197. See Ashe, 397 U.S. at 446 (holding that collateral estoppel only protects those who are
acquitted); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (noting that defendants have a double jeop-
ardy interest in finality).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 149-51.
199. The application of Blockburger in the context of successive prosecutions is based mainly
on shielding defendants from these burdens. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. at 165-66. Blockburger
serves different constitutional values in the context of successive prosecutions than it does in the
context of multiple punishments. Until Grady, however, no constitutional inquiries beyond Block-
burger were inspired specifically by this same concern.
200. If applicable to evidence that has already been admitted, Grady benefits defendants in
two ways that it could not were it applicable only in the pretrial context. First, in many jurisdic-
tions and in the federal courts, defendants do not waive double jeopardy objections by failing to
raise them before trial. See, e.g., United States v. Blocker, 802 F.2d 1102, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986);
Johnson v. State, 460 So. 2d 954, 958 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Ex parte Stephens, 753 S.W.2d
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specifying only when an impending trial implicates double jeopardy
concerns.20 For this reason, the applicability of Grady is uncertain
when a defendant claims a double jeopardy violation on appeal. Al-
though Grady is relatively clear about when anticipated prosecutorial
proof violates the double jeopardy clause, the rule is silent about how a
court should evaluate the double jeopardy implications of evidence ac-
tually offered or admitted at trial. Lower courts, however, have assumed
that Grady applies to conduct that already has been proved in addition
to conduct that will be proved. 0
Although perhaps unsurprising, 0 3 this development is significant
for two reasons. First, it makes double jeopardy relief under the Grady
rule available to defendants throughout the judicial process. Thus, even
if a Grady violation was not discovered at the pretrial stage, an appel-
late court still might overrule a conviction on double jeopardy grounds.
Second, the Grady rule is far more difficult to apply to completed trials
than pending ones. The inquiry into whether a pending prosecution vio-
lates the double jeopardy clause is relatively easy in many cases. The
defendant simply can use any available procedural devices to determine
208, 210 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). But see State v. Lee, 502 A.2d 332, 334 (R.I. 1985). In those jurisdic-
tions, a double jeopardy claim may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Blocker, 802 F.2d at
1103; Johnson, 460 So. 2d at 958. Therefore, in those jurisdictions, a defendant can claim a Grady
violation on appeal based on evidence that was admitted at trial, whether or not he or she made a
pretrial claim. In addition, many jurisdictions allow a double jeopardy claim to be raised, for the
first time on habeas corpus proceedings or similar forms of collateral attack. See, e.g., Adamson v.
Ricketts, 789 F.2d 722, 735 n.1 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 483 U.S. 1 (1987); Johnson,
460 So. 2d at 958. As a result, the prosecution would be unable to bar relief under Grady by hiding
their intention to prove conduct that violates Grady until such time as the defendant has waived
his right to object.
Second, the ability to raise a double jeopardy claim based on the events at trial is particularly
important, given the fact that an appeal of a pretrial double jeopardy claim may not be available
to the defendant. In the federal system, interlocutory appeals are usually available for double jeop-
ardy claims. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 & n.8 (stating that a federal statute
requires interlocutory appeals for all but "frivolous" double jeopardy claims). Most state courts
hold that a defendant usually has a right to an interlocutory appeal. See Nalbandian v. Superior
Court, 786 P.2d 977, 981 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (discussing the approach of courts in other jurisdic-
tions). Where the jurisdiction does not provide an interlocutory appeal, however, the application of
Grady beyond the pretrial stage ensures appellate review of Grady claims.
201. The Grady Court did not discuss the applicability of its rule to conduct that has already
been proved at trial. This doubtlessly is due in part to the procedural context of the case. Corbin's
case had not yet reached trial; the case was before the United States Supreme Court on appeal
from an order by the New York Court of Appeals to dismiss the case. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2089.
The Court phrased the rule in terms of what the prosecution will do at trial, not what the prosecu-
tion has done. See id. at 2093.
202. For instance, appellate courts have applied Grady to invalidate jury convictions on
double jeopardy grounds. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Trickey, 938 F.2d 899 (8th Cir. 1991); Harrelson v.
State, 569 So. 2d 295 (Miss. 1990); State v. Urban, 796 S.W.2d 599 (Mo. 1990).
203. Justice Scalia simply assumed that Grady did apply to evidence already introduced at
trial. See 110 S. Ct. at 2104 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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what conduct the prosecution intends to prove. °4 In short, the defend-
ant determines what conduct the prosecutors will prove by asking
them.20 5 Furthermore, if the defendant can make a colorable showing
that a Grady violation might occur, the defendant apparently is enti-
tled to a pretrial hearing in which the government must show that it
will not prove conduct in violation of Grady. °6
In the postconviction context, however, a court presumably must
apply Grady based on what occurred at trial. This process is more diffi-
cult than a pretrial evaluation for two reasons. First, Grady does not
indicate, in a postconviction situation, whether a court should consider
the conduct that the prosecution intended to prove or the conduct that
was actually proved.20 7 Lower courts implicitly have adopted the latter
proposition and have focused entirely on what occurred at the trial it-
self. 0 Furthermore, if the proper inquiry involves an evaluation of the
conduct actually proved, the rule fails to address situations in which the
defendant was responsible for the introduction of some of the proof. 209
Even without this added complication, postconviction review remains a
complex task. For instance, in contrast to merely reading a prosecu-
tion's bill of particulars, which enumerates what conduct the prosecu-
tion intends to prove, postconviction review requires the court to
determine what conduct the prosecution actually proved. 210 The latter
undeftaking is considerably more difficult.211 Second, the Grady Court
204. See 110 S. Ct. at 2094 & n.14. The Court discounted the possibility that, in a given
jurisdiction, adequate procedures might not exist for the defendant to determine what conduct the
prosecution would prove, which a defendant must know to a certain degree in order to make any
colorable Grady claim. Id. But see id. at 2098 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that implementation
of Grady depends upon the existence of adequate criminal discovery devices, which may or may
not exist under the state procedural rules).
205. The Court failed to address the effect of state laws that do not bind the prosecution to
its answers because New York law, conveniently, did so bind the prosecution. 110 S. Ct. at 2094.
206. See id. at 2094 n.14; Taylor v. Whitley, 933 F.2d 325, 329 (5th Cir. 1991).
207. Justice Scalia apparently assumed that applying Grady to trials already begun would
implicate the conduct that actually had been proved. See 110 S. Ct. at 2104 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The other reading, however, is certainly a reasonable construction of Grady as applied to trials
already begun.
208. E.g., McIntyre v. Trickey, 938 F.2d 899, 906 (8th Cir. 1991); State v. Magazine, 393
S.E.2d 385, 387 (S.C. 1990).
209. See Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2104 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210. See id.
211. An appellate court would have to make a determination, from the whole record, as to
what had or had not been proved. Obviously, the record available to the appellate court could be
extremely unclear in this regard.
Justice Brennan might have more confidence than Justice Scalia that a court would be able to
identify a Grady violation without the help of generous procedural devices. He noted that a court
should hold a pretrial hearing to determine whether a Grady violation exists, during which the
court presumably could consider factors not revealed by the bill of particulars or other procedural
devices. See id. at 2094. An appellate court, however, might be bound by the record whereas a trial
court is not limited to examining procedural devices. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 575
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failed to define the term "prove" or to identify the standard of proof
necessary to trigger a double jeopardy violation.212
The application of the Grady rule to conduct that already has been
proved also poses particular problems for trial courts. The role of trial
courts is clear with respect to applying Grady before trial.2 13 Their role
with respect to conduct that already has been admitted at trial is far
less clear. Before a given trial, for example, it might appear that the
prosecution does not intend to prove conduct in violation of Grady.
During the trial, however, either side unexpectedly might prove such
conduct for a variety of reasons.214 Grady left unanswered whether the
introduction of unforeseen proof should be sufficient reason for taking
the extreme measure of halting the trial immediately on double jeop-
ardy grounds.1 Thus, the relatively neat pretrial inquiry envisioned by
the Court is far more complicated once the trial begins.
2. The Impact of Grady on Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
Grady also jeopardizes the manner in which prosecutors may use
one of their most powerful weapons, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)21 6
and its state equivalents.21 Rule 404(b) allows the admission of evi-
dence of other crimes to prove, among other things, motive, intent,
identity, knowledge, or lack of mistake or accident.21 8 The Rule allows
trial courts to use their discretion in admitting such evidence for any
relevant purpose other than to show a defendant's propensity to com-
mit crimes.2 9 The admission of evidence under Rule 404(b), however, is
(1989) (stating that double jeopardy claims usually should be resolved by appellate courts without
venturing beyond the record); Hedgebeth v. North Carolina, 334 U.S. 806, 807 (1948) (holding that
in reviewing state court judgments, the Supreme Court is bound by the record of that court). But
see United States v. Atkins, 834 F.2d 426, 439 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that evidence outside the
record is permissible in making a double jeopardy claim). If the appellate court must decide solely
on the record, determining what conduct had been proved at trial could be very difficult.
212. The Court failed to identify whether the appropriate standard of proof was (1) enough
evidence to go to the jury, (2) more likely than not, or (3) proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 110 S.
Ct. at 2104 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
213. The trial court merely needs to determine from the prosecution's disclosures the con-
duct that it intends to prove. Such an inquiry ordinarily should be easy in jurisdictions that pro-
vide adequate discovery because the defendant can use discovery devices to force the prosecution
to disclose this information in explicit terms. See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
214. The defendant might prove conduct that violates Grady in an attempt to cause a "self-
inflicted" double jeopardy violation that, in turn, would entitle the defendant to relief. See 110 S.
Ct. at 2104 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
215. Id.
216. The text of Rule 404(b) appears supra at note 45.
217. A majority of states have adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 404 either verbatim or in
some modified form. See JACK WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S EVDENCE 404(21).
218. FED. R. EvD. 404(b).
219. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 934 F.2d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Fosher, 568 F.2d 207, 212 (1st Cir. 1978).
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subject to constitutional restraints. Thus, the Court's adoption of the
Grady rule has generated concern over the extent to which this new
constitutional standard will prohibit the use of evidence otherwise ad-
missible under Rule 404(b).
2 20
On its face, Grady does not appear concerned with the constitu-
tionality of other-crimes evidence. The rule is phrased to bar prosecu-
tions, not evidence.22 In addition, the procedural posture of Grady was
not conducive to framing an evidentiary rule. Grady reached the Su-
preme Court before any trial or the admission of any evidence had oc-
curred.222  Nevertheless, Grady's practical effect is clear. The
prosecution cannot introduce evidence of conduct constituting an of-
fense for which the defendant already has been prosecuted in order to
prove an essential element of a crime for which the defendant is on
trial.223
In one respect, Grady will not impair the continued vitality of Rule
404(b). Because Grady does not apply to past crimes or other bad acts
for which a defendant has not been prosecuted, Rule 404(b) still will
allow the prosecution to introduce such evidence. Certainly, this is no
small advantage to prosecutors.
224
Grady, however, undoubtedly will have some effect on the prosecu-
tion's ability to use evidence of past crimes for which the defendant has
been prosecuted previously. The magnitude of that effect will depend
on the outcome of two issues left unsettled in Grady. First, the Court
gave little indication of where it will draw the line between conduct
that constitutes an offense and conduct that does not.225 Although some
lower courts have shown little reluctance to hold evidence inadmissible
under Grady, a narrow reading of the Grady rule may allow the intro-
220. Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2096 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also United States
v. Clark, 928 F.2d 639, 642 (4th Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3704 (U.S. Apr. 16
1991) (No. 90-1527).
221. See State v. Nunez, 806 P.2d 861, 865 (Ariz. 1991). The precise wording of the rule
actually may stem from the majority's desire to distinguish Grady from Dowling. In Dowling the
defendant complained about evidence that had been admitted against him in a trial that led to his
conviction. In Grady the defendant claimed that the imminent prosecution itself was unconstitu-
tional and should be prohibited. At least one court has recognized that the distinction between
challenging a prosecution and challenging evidence is sufficient to distinguish Dowling and Grady.
United States v. Felix, 926 F.2d 1522, 1528 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 59 U.S.L.W. 3726 (U.S. Oct.
7, 1991) (No. 90-1599).
222. In Grady, since no trial ever occurred, no evidence could have been introduced.
223. The Grady Court itself suggested that its rule prescribes what evidence of conduct may
be introduced, rather than what prosecutions may be made. See 110 S. Ct. at 2094.
224. See, e.g., Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence:
Rules 404(b), 608(b), and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 135 (observing that allowing the introduction of
past-acts evidence always creates a risk of unfair advantage for the prosecution).




duction of much evidence of prior bad acts.22 6 Second, the scope of the
Court's limitation of the Grady rule to only evidence directed at an es-
sential element of a crime charged remains unclear. How the Court will
read this limitation is difficult to forecast.
Grady bars only evidence used to establish an essential element of
a crime charged.227 Unless evidence bears on one or more essential ele-
ments of a crime, however, it is irrelevant and, thus, inadmissible. 2 8
From this perspective, the Grady rule might be rephrased as follows:
even if otherwise admissible, the prosecution may not introduce evi-
dence of past crimes that constitutes an offense for which defendant
already has been prosecuted.
At least one court, however, has adopted a different interpretation
of the essential elements requirement.229 Proof that can be character-
ized as bearing on an essential element for the purposes of determining
relevancy23 ° need not be so characterized for the purposes of Grady.
231
Under this alternative construction, proof is introduced to establish an
essential element only if that proof constitutes the entirety of that ele-
ment.232 Thus, a more attenuated relationship between evidence and an
essential element might render the evidence relevant without bringing
that evidence within the Grady rule. The Court might prefer this nar-
row interpretation of Grady because it gives meaning to otherwise nu-
gatory language.233 Furthermore, should the Court choose to read
Grady narrowly, it will prevent the dilution of Rule 404(b).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 172-73.
227. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2087.
228. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 (1979); United States v. Hall, 653 F.2d 1002,
1005 (5th Cir. 1981).
229. United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 639, 642 (4th Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed, 59
U.S.L.W. 3704 (U.S. Apr. 16, 1991) (No. 90-1527).
230. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the exis-
tence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EvD. 401. Courts should construe this
term broadly. United States v. Hollister, 746 F.2d 420, 422 (8th Cir. 1984).
231. See Clark, 928 F.2d at 642.
232. Clark, 928 F.2d at 642 (quoting United States v. Calderone, 917 F.2d 717, 724 (2d Cir.
1990) (Newman, J., concurring)). This approach means that Grady is not triggered merely because
the prosecution introduces evidence that tends to prove an essential element. Under this formula-
tion, evidence might be relevant and not barred by Grady.
233. Calderone, 917 F.2d at 724 (opining that the courts "are obliged to apply Grady in a
way that gives the 'element' component significance") (Newman, J., concurring); Unwin v. Camp-
bell, 863 F.2d 124 (1st Cir. 1988) (suggesting that Supreme Court opinions should not be construed
in a way that makes some of the Court's language nugatory). Cf. Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561
(1943) (stating that statutes should not be construed in a manner that relegates certain language to
the status of mere surplusage).
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V. SUGGESTED REFORM: DISCONTINUED USE OF THE BLOCKBURGER
TEST IN THE CONTEXT OF MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS IMPOSED IN STATE
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
The crux of the disagreement between the majority and the dis-
sent 234 in Grady concerned the role of the Blockburger test in determin-
ing when successive prosecutions violate the double jeopardy clause.
The dissent noted that, outside the narrow exceptions prescribed by
Ashe3 5 and Harris,38 the Blockburger test had been, and should re-
main, the exclusive test for whether successive prosecutions violated the
double jeopardy clause.3 7 The majority, however, concluded that the
Blockburger test alone could not adequately protect defendants from
the burdens of multiple prosecutions. 28 The majority, therefore, added
an extra double jeopardy test-the Grady rule.239
Grady demonstrated the Court's willingness to recognize those sit-
uations in which the double jeopardy clause demands protection be-
yond that offered under the Blockburger test. If, however, the purpose
of the Court's inquiry is, as the majority states, to honor the values
embodied in the clause,240 it is equally reasonable for the Court to rec-
ognize situations in which applying the Blockburger test fails to serve
any double jeopardy interests. In other words, if the Grady Court was
correct that Blockburger's role in double jeopardy law is shaped by the
interests it serves, then the rule should be applied only when it serves
those interests.
Although the Blockburger test may provide insufficient protection
in the context of successive prosecutions, it well may overprotect de-
fendants in the context of multiple punishments.241 Thus, if the Court
is willing to reconsider Blockburger in order to increase double jeopardy
protection when necessary, it should be equally willing to discontinue
applications of Blockburger that are not mandated by the clause, even
if the result is a decrease in protection for defendants.
234. There were actually two dissenting opinions. Justice O'Connor wrote a separate dissent-
ing opinion, but she agreed with much of Justice Scalia's dissent. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2095
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
235. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
236. Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977). See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
237. 110 S. Ct. at 2097 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
238. 110 S. Ct. at 2093; see also id. at 2091 n.8 (suggesting that Blockburger by itself protects
criminal defendants sufficiently only when the issue is whether cumulative punishments are
permissible).
239. See id. at 2093.
240. See id. at 2093-94.
241. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 341 (arguing that a test for double jeopardy violations can




In light of the Court's reevaluation of Blockburger in Grady, this
Recent Development proposes an overdue reform: the discontinuation
of the Blockburger test in the context of multiple punishments imposed
in state criminal proceedings.
A. Identifying the Constitutional Basis for the Blockburger Test in
the Context of Multiple Punishments
Much of the confusion regarding Blockburger is attributable to the
Supreme Court's strange characterization of the rule. In the context of
multiple punishments, but not successive prosecutions, 242 the Block-
burger test has a dual nature: it is both a rule of statutory construc-
tion243 and a constitutional rule244 providing the exclusive definition of
the clause's same offense language.245 The Court, however, consistently
has ignored its own avowed rationale for incorporating the rule of statu-
tory construction into the double jeopardy clause.246 By failing to con-
sider carefully the interplay between the statutory and constitutional
natures of Blockburger, the Court has neglected the constitutional basis
for the test. As a result, the Court has applied the test to situations in
which it cannot possibly serve its stated purpose.241
Although the Blockburger Court never mentioned the double jeop-
ardy clause, or any other reason for evaluating the sameness of the two
offenses involved in the case, the Court decided Blockburger on double
jeopardy grounds. The Blockburger Court extracted its test expressly
from Gavieres v. United States,248 which clearly adopted its test for
multiple offenses as a matter of double jeopardy law.249 Subsequent
courts have characterized Blockburger as a rule of statutory construc-
tion, written to prevent courts and prosecutors from defeating legisla-
tive intent by imposing multiple punishments when Congress intended
to impose only one.250 Therefore, Blockburger did not establish a statu-
242. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 374 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
243. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2091.
244. The Court has declared that the Constitution requires the application of the Block-
burger test in the context of multiple punishments as a part of the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers. See infra notes 255-57 and accompanying text.
245. See id. at 2091 n.8.
246. See supra note 244.
247. See, e.g., Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (applying Blockburger to the imposition of multiple pun-
ishments under state law).
248. 220 U.S. 338 (1911).
249. See id. at 341-42. The Gavieres court, in turn, borrowed its test from Morey v. Com-
monwealth, 108 Mass. 433 (1871).
250. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S.
386, 392-93 (1958). See also United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105, 108 (1985) (stating that
Blockburger is a rule for determining whether Congress intended to allow cumulative punishment);
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 337 (1981) (noting that "this court has looked to the
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tory rule subsequently incorporated by the Court into the Constitution,
but rather a constitutional rule, which the Court later began to treat as
a rule of statutory construction.251
In the context of multiple punishments, Blockburger's sole purpose
is not to prevent Congress from purposefully imposing multiple punish-
ments, but rather to help determine what punishments Congress in-
tended.52 In fact, even if a court has imposed multiple punishments for
what Blockburger indicates is the same offense, no constitutional viola-
tion exists if Congress intended that multiple punishments be availa-
ble.2 53 Thus, the double jeopardy clause, in all situations, does not
require the prohibition of multiple punishments for what Blockburger
labels the same offense.254 Instead, it requires an accurate assessment of
congressional intent regarding multiple punishments. If two offenses
constitute the same offense under Blockburger, the court presumes that
Congress did not intend the imposition of more than one punishment.
The prosecution, however, may rebut that finding with evidence of con-
trary legislative intent.255 In Whalen v. United States2 5 the Court ex-
plained why the Constitution requires effectuation of congressional
intent regarding multiple punishments. The double jeopardy clause em-
bodies the separation of powers mandate that only Congress may pre-
scribe punishment for federal criminal offenses.257 Thus, Blockburger
may be characterized as both a constitutional mandate and as a rule of
statutory construction.5"
Blockburger rule to determine whether Congress intended that two statutory offenses be punished
cumulatively"); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691 (1980) (commenting that the Block-
burger test is intended to determine whether Congress, in a given situation, has provided for
cumulative punishments for two statutory offenses).
251. The development of the current view of Blockburger as a rule of statutory construction
probably was completed in Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
252. See sources cited supra note 32; State v. Haggard, 619 S.W.2d 44, 51 (Mo. 1981), va-
cated, 459 U.S. 1192 (1983). Contra Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 373-74 (1983) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the double jeopardy clause must protect defendants from legislatures
because it is a constitutional right). But cf. Thomas, supra note 32, at 107 (pointing out that
legislatures are checked by the application of the double jeopardy clause in the context of succes-
sive prosecutions).
253. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985).
254. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368. Cf. Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340 (finding that the reverse is also
true-i.e., that the Blockburger test also is not controlling if it indicates that Congress intended
multiple punishment when it actually did not).
255. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368.
256. 445 U.S. 684 (1980).
257. See id. at 695.
258. In determining whether the court may impose multiple punishments for the same of-
fense, "the petitioner's claim under the double jeopardy clause cannot be separated entirely from a
resolution of the question of statutory construction." Id. at 688.
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B. Blockburger Should Not Apply to Multiple Punishments
Imposed in State Criminal Proceedings
Clearly, the Court has decided that a limited purpose-respecting
and effectuating congressional intent-exists for Blockburger's inquiry
into the constitutionality of multiple punishments.2 59 As a result, courts
should limit the application of Blockburger in that context. When the
constitutional interest that Blockburger protects is not implicated, eval-
uating the imposition of multiple punishments under the Blockburger
test is, at best, a waste of effort and, at worst, a violation of the princi-
ple of federalism embodied in the Constitution.26 °
Applying Blockburger to multiple punishments imposed in state
criminal prosecutions presents such a situation. Although a state court
might impose a punishment not authorized by the state legislature, the
imposition of penalties under state statutes does not violate Block-
burger's mandate that federal courts not impose punishments unautho-
rized by Congress. Nevertheless, both the Supreme Court and state
courts have applied Blockburger in order to ensure that state courts
adhere to the intent of their legislatures.2 61
The application of Blockburger to state prosecutions seems unre-
lated to the separation of powers principle that Blockburger protects.
First, the separation of powers doctrine is not mandatory on the
states; 62 thus, no constitutional dilemma exists if a state court, rather
259. See supra text accompanying notes 251-58.
260. When the Supreme Court applies the Blockburger test to state court proceedings, it
necessarily interprets state law and the intent of state legislatures, rather than federal law and
federal legislative intent. Because the state courts, in the course of deciding whether or nor to
impose multiple punishments, already have interpreted the state statutes in question, they have
decided, either explicitly or implicitly, whether their respective legislatures intended the imposi-
tion of multiple punishments. Thus, the Court's review may run afoul of the adequate and inde-
pendent state ground doctrine, which states that, in most cases, a state court judgment on a matter
of state law is binding on a federal court that cannot decide a question of federal law without first
deciding a question of state law. See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 91935). But cf.
Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938) (noting that the Court must grant
deference to a state court's construction of state law but that the Court itself must construe state
statutes to ensure the vindication of federal constitutional rights). In addition, under Article III of
the Constitution, the Court lacks jurisdiction to review a state court's interpretation of state stat-
utes. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 687 (1980). See also infra text accompanying notes
265-66.
261. See, e.g., Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983); People v. Robideau, 355 N.W.2d 592,
596 (Mich. 1984).
262. "Whether the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of a State shall be kept alto-
gether distinct and separate, or whether persons. . . belonging to one department may, in respect
to some matters, exert powers which, strictly speaking, pertain to another department of govern-
ment, is for the determination of the state." Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902). See also
Whalen, 445 U.S. at 689 n.4. The Court clearly has forgotten this precept. Referring to the Mis-
souri legislature, the Court in Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368, said, "[l]egislatures, not courts, prescribe
the scope of punishments."
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than the state legislature, is the body authorizing punishment.2 3 The
Blockburger inquiry into legislative intent regarding multiple punish-
ments is required under the double jeopardy clause only if Congress is
that legislature.264 As a result, courts have no justification for applying
Blockburger to state criminal proceedings. Second, the Supreme Court
may be overstepping its jurisdiction when it undertakes the task of in-
terpreting state statutes to determine what punishment the state legis-
lature intended.26 5 If not, the Supreme Court nevertheless should be
hesitant to construe state legislation because it lacks expertise compara-
ble to that of the state courts in this area.2 6
If the Court wishes to pursue its apparent goal of conforming tests
for double jeopardy violations with the various constitutional interests
at stake, it should discontinue the use of Blockburger-or any rule of
statutory construction-in state court proceedings. The Court, of
course, could recognize a new constitutional interest.267 Nevertheless, to
the extent that imposing multiple punishments for the same offense is
263. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the double jeopardy clause may not limit
the state courts' power to authorize punishment. Whalen, 445 U.S. at 689-90 n.4. The Court an-
swered this contention, however, by suggesting that no harm is done by the improper application
of Blockburger to state prosecutions. Even if a state constitution permitted state courts to author-
ize punishment, "tihe Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... would presumably
prohibit state courts from depriving persons of liberty or property . . . except to the extent au-
thorized by state law." Id. at 690 n.4. This due process argument, however, would require the
difficult determination of whether state courts who have authorized punishment have authorized it
in accordance with state law. At any rate, the existence of a theoretical due process argument fails
to cure any defects in the double jeopardy analysis.
264. See id. at 689.
265. See, e.g., id. at 687; Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 167 (1977); United States v. Thirty-
seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971). Of course, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to
review state statutes and to determine if they are unconstitutional. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435,
443-44 (1970). See also Thomas, supra note 32, at 119-20 (arguing that the Supreme Court's defer-
ral to state court interpretations of the intent of state legislatures would show respect for the
independent status of state courts). In applying Blockburger to multiple punishments imposed in a
single state prosecution, however, the Court takes an extra step. First, it interprets the state stat-
utes and then it determines whether, under that interpretation, the statute passes constitutional
muster. Of course, this approach differs completely from mere review for constitutional infirmities.
The Court might argue that, in these cases, it does accept state court interpretations of state
statutes. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368. Cf. Brown, 432 U.S. at 167 (decided in the context of succes-
sive prosecutions). Such an argument is unpersuasive because, if that were the case, the Court
would never hear a case on appeal from a conviction where multiple punishments were imposed in
the course of a single state proceeding. The simple fact that the conviction still stands evidences
that the state courts felt that multiple punishments were authorized by the legislature (unless the
Court makes the erroneous assumption that state courts prefer to ignore legislative intent). There-
fore, the very fact that the Court hears the case represents a challenge to the state court's
interpretation.
266. See, e.g., Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 484 (1981); Thomas, supra
note 32, at 120.
267. This option has particular appeal because it simply is hard to believe that the double
jeopardy clause has anything to do with the doctrine of separation of powers.
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not nearly as unfair as multiple prosecutions for the same offense, de-
fendants probably do not have another liberty interest on which a con-
stitutional prohibition of multiple punishments for the same offense
could be based.268
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has been aware for many years that criminal
defendants have a special interest in avoiding successive prosecutions.
In adopting the Grady rule, the Court has held for the first time that
the Blockburger test does not offer criminal defendants sufficient safe-
guards against the particular onus of successive prosecutions. As a re-
sult, Grady has expanded double jeopardy rights significantly. Some
lower courts have carried this expansion even further by applying the
Grady rule to evidence already introduced at trial.
Grady embraces a view of double jeopardy rights uncircumscribed
by the language of the double jeopardy clause. Furthermore, the Grady
rule itself lacks any effective definition of its scope. Read broadly, the
Grady rule may operate to exclude much evidence of prior conduct for
which a defendant previously has been prosecuted. Such a reading,
however, brings the rule in direct conflict with Dowling, an unsurprising
result when one considers the lack of precedent for the Grady decision.
Grady thus may protect criminal defendants in a manner previously
considered unnecessary. A narrow reading of Grady is more consistent
with the Court's prior double jeopardy jurisprudence and will prevent
the evisceration of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Because the Grady
majority left important issues unsettled, the Court should take its earli-
est opportunity to clarify and define the scope of the Grady rule.
Despite the inadequacies of the majority's opinion in Grady, how-
ever, its recognition that strict adherence to the Blockburger test fails
to link adequately the protections afforded defendants to the values
embodied in the double jeopardy clause lays the groundwork for further
evaluations of the efficacy of the Blockburger test. Thus, the Supreme
Court should discontinue using the Blockburger test in evaluating the
propriety of multiple punishments imposed in the course of a single
268. The defendant's fairness interest in avoiding multiple punishments is limited to avoid-
ing unauthorized punishments. See supra text accompanying note 25. Grave constitutional con-
cerns do not occur merely because a defendant is sentenced to cumulative punishments. Often no
constitutional infirmity arises with the imposition of the combined punishment under one statute.
For example, if a state can impose a 15-year sentence, then it may impose, consistent with the
Constitution, a 25-year sentence. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 294 (1983). Therefore, constitu-
tional concerns should not exist if that 25-year sentence is composed of 15- and 10-year segments.
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state prosecution. This reform would contribute to the Grady Court's
goal of providing double jeopardy protection that corresponds more
closely to the specific constitutional interests at stake.
Eli J. Richardson
